Sometimes the optical character recognition will guess wrong. So it is entirely possible to be pulled over mistakenly based on a hit from the license plate scanner. As more systems go online, deployed in every local, state, and federal law enforcement vehicle, and even at stationary points, like entrance points to a city, what does this mean? Where does all the data get collected, and shared, and for what purpose? With all of this data, the government will be capable of massive retroactive searches with no warrant or probable cause.
The data is being collected, and can be used for any purpose in the future. The possibilities to use this location placement data to create circumstantial evidence against you will quickly become overwhelming. No, not according to the law.
You have no expectation of privacy while out in public. Courts have regularly held that police officers are allowed to randomly type license tags into their computer as they pass by.
These systems are just a version of that on steroids. Additional local police departments are setting up these systems every day, often paid for by federal grants or homeland security. And all that data will sit… somewhere. Officers can only identify the registered owner of a vehicle by querying a separate, secure state government database of vehicle license plate records, which is restricted, controlled, and audited.
The federal Driver's Privacy Protection Act DPPA restricts access and prohibits the release of personal information from state motor vehicle records to ensure the privacy of citizens.
At least 14 states have enacted legislation on the use of ALPRs. More detailed information can be found here. Jurisdictions throughout the nation and around the world are continuing research on current operations, emerging best practices, performance metrics, and business benefit realization. The precise configuration of ALPR systems varies depending on the manufacturer of the equipment and the specific operational deployment.
ALPR systems typically capture the following information: a contextual photo of the vehicle, an image of the license plate, the geographic coordinates of where the image was captured, and the date and time of the recording. The ALPR camera does not identify any individual or access their personal information through its analysis of license plate numbers. The data captured by the ALPR unit itself is completely anonymous. There is no personally identifiable information contained in an ALPR record and the operator can only determine the registered owner of a vehicle by querying a separate, secure state government database of vehicle license plate records, which is restricted, controlled, and audited.
Agencies vary in their ALPR data retention policies based in part on their strategic and tactical objectives in using the technology, and the specific laws and regulations of their jurisdictions. Research is presently underway to define specific ALPR metrics that will help in establishing an empirical foundation to data retention policies.
Only authorized law enforcement personnel who have met the minimum training, certification, and background checks required for access to criminal justice data should have access to the ALPR database. Access to an ALPR database should be restricted to trained and authorized law enforcement users who have a specific and approved authorization to access the database for a lawful purpose that includes both a need to know and a right to know the information.
Failure to manually confirm, combined with machine error, has caused wrongful stops. Law enforcement claims that ALPR data has been used to, for example, recover stolen cars or find abducted children. However, police have also used ALPR data for mass enforcement of less serious offenses, such as searching for uninsured drivers or tracking down individuals with overdue court fees.
The ACLU estimates that less than 0. Many law enforcement agencies store ALPR data for years, and share it with other law enforcement agencies and federal agencies.
The length of time that ALPR data is retained varies from agency to agency, from as short as mere days to as long as several years, although some entities—including private companies—may retain the data indefinitely. The companies then share the commercially-collected data not just with law enforcement but also with auto recovery aka 'repo' companies, banks, credit reporting agencies, and insurance companies. Data collected by private entities does not have retention limits and is not subject to sunshine laws, or any of the other safeguards that are sometimes found in the government sector.
ALPR is a powerful surveillance technology that can be used to invade the privacy of individuals as well as to violate the rights of entire communities. Law enforcement agencies have abused this technology.
Police officers in New York drove down a street and electronically recorded the license plate numbers of everyone parked near a mosque. Police in Birmingham targeted a Muslim community while misleading the public about the project. Moreover, many individual officers have abused law enforcement databases, including license plate information and records held by motor vehicle departments.
In , a Washington, D. In addition to deliberate misuse, ALPRs sometimes misread plates, leading to dire consequences. In , San Francisco police pulled over Denise Green, an African-American city worker, handcuffed her at gunpoint, forced her to her knees, and searched both her and her vehicle—all because her car was misidentified as stolen due to a license plate reader error.
Her experience led the U. Aggregate data stored for lengthy periods of time or indefinitely becomes more invasive and revealing, and it is susceptible to both misuse and data breach. Sensible retention limits, specific policies about who inside an agency is allowed to access data, and audit and control processes could help minimize these issues.
One of the better privacy protections would be for police to retain no information at all when a passing vehicle does not match a hot list. EFF has been investigating and combating the privacy threats of ALPR technology through public records requests, litigation, and legislative advocacy since Law enforcement agencies with limited technical expertise are often challenged to select technology based equipment, systems and services.
Trade shows and vendor claims can be problematic to sort through. Recognizing this dilemma the U. Its focus group recommendations set evaluation criteria, comparison methodology, and selected four vendors for evaluation. Systems were evaluated on a 5 point scale in the areas of capability, usability, deployability and maintainability. CarDetector by Vigilant Video received the overall lowest score of 3.
Engstrom, If a local agency is deploying new ALPR technology, the consideration for regional compatibility with ALPR systems used by other local agencies should be considered. A good first step would be to talk to their other local agencies that are already using ALPR systems and learn from their experience. I believe that ALPR is already an effective tool for law enforcement, and like all technology, it continues to improve rapidly with time.
Lau is a law enforcement official in Southern California. He completed this paper in conjunction with his course work while pursuing his BA in Criminal Justice Management. References Associated Press. ACLU objects to plate scanners in police cruisers. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research , 28 1 , Engstrom, C.
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